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In the spring of 1967, Chester Bowles, the United States’ Ambassador in India, launched a 
blistering public attack on the intensification within the subcontinent of ‘a carefully calculated, 
massively financed campaign’ of Communist black propaganda, or information designed to 
create the impression that it was produced by those it was intended to discredit. Bowles’ 
stinging denunciation was carried on the front-page of the American Reporter, a bi-weekly 
publication distributed free of charge throughout the country by the United States Information 
Agency (USIA), and widely reproduced by Indian wire services. The Ambassador claimed that 
‘week after week’ India’s Communist press had printed ‘a whole series of devious editorials 
and concocted ‘“news” stories’ designed to discredit himself, his Embassy, and the wider 
United States government. The ‘utterly false’ allegations in circulation, the Ambassador noted, 
included accusations that America was covertly recycling funds from the sale of agricultural 
commodities to finance right-wing Indian politicians, and employing young volunteers 
attached to the Peace Corps programme as ‘spies and saboteurs.’ Bowles took particular 
exception to the reproduction of a series of forged documents that purportedly originated from 
official British and American sources, and that were ‘carefully calculated to harm the U.S. 
efforts to assist Indian development.’ The Ambassador called out the Communist press for 
indulging in ‘international character assassination’ which, by targeting a nation rather than 
specific individuals, circumvented India’s libel laws. In the circumstances, Bowles proclaimed, 
‘there is no recourse except a bold airing of the facts, so that the public can know and judge 
the full story.’1 
The importance of nonaligned nations and, India, more especially, in the story of Western 
responses to Soviet Cold War disinformation operations has been elided by an inclination on 
the part of historians and political scientists to frame issues surrounding black propaganda in 
an East-West paradigm.2 As early as 1961, one recently declassified Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) study suggested that public attention needed to be directed towards covert 
propaganda practiced by Sino-Soviet Bloc intelligence services beyond Europe and North 
America.3 Such calls for a geographic rebalancing in studies appraising Soviet black 
propaganda campaigns went largely unheeded. What focus has been placed on disinformation 
campaigns inside the developing world has hinged on perspectives derived from Western and 
Soviet sources and has downplayed, or ignored, the responses and agency of Asian and African 
actors.4  
This article shifts the axis of the Cold War to examine the wider diplomatic impact of British 
and American reactions to covert Soviet propaganda and forgery operations from a North-
South standpoint. As one CIA report on Soviet clandestine subversive activity emphasized in 
the late 1950s, the promotion of communist ideology ‘was not an essential factor in these [black 
propaganda] operations.’ Their objective  was invariably, ‘to compromise, discredit, and 
ultimately destroy the governments, organisations and individuals most likely to block the 
increase of Communist and Bloc power in the area concerned…’ That said, the United States 
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was not above conducting disinformation-by-forgery. In 1953, one notable operation saw the 
CIA disseminate a fictitious autobiography of the pro-Soviet Iranian émigré poet, Abulqasim 
Lahuti. Packed full of criticism of Moscow’s policies towards Soviet Central Asian Republics 
and the wider Middle East, the CIA ruse backfired and succeeded only in bolstering Lahuti’s 
standing in the USSR, empowering him to push for a moderation in Stalinist repression of 
Persian and Tajik culture.5  
Equally, British intelligence indulged in what came to be known as special political action 
(SPA), or activity that encompassed bribery, forgery, and covert funding of political parties. In 
the summer of 1960, in preparation for a meeting intended to co-ordinate information 
operations with American colleagues, British officials discussed plans for black propaganda 
work, including the use of forgery. In suggesting that Britain ‘take the lead’ in this area, 
Whitehall revealed not only a willingness to engage in disinformation-by-forgery, but also the 
perception that British covert propagandists were especially proficient in such matters and had 
a thing or two to teach the Americans. In detailing forgery operations mounted against 
international trade union organisations with communist connections, including the World 
Federation of Trade Unions, British official enthused that ‘we should not hesitate to draw a 
bow at a [forgery] venture’ that offered ‘suitable targets’. ‘Even if it [a forgery] achieves 
nothing else,’ the British concluded pragmatically, ‘the [ensuing] investigation by the 
communists has its own disruptive effects.’6 As will become evident, India was not immune 
from British SPA. In many respects, non-aligned India offered an ideal environment in which 
to conduct black propaganda. An open democracy, with a large, free, and vibrant press, and a 
population broadly opposed to entering into Cold War alliances of any ideological stripe, India 
offered ample, ‘cover for covert political action operations directed towards the manipulation 
of groups not otherwise susceptible to… manipulation.’7 
The article also reperiodizes the study of Cold War disinformation activity. An emphasis 
has been placed on early Cold War propaganda in intelligence literature. Likewise, 
considerable attention has been devoted to espionage and covert action that occurred near the 
end of the Cold War period, at a time when East-West détente withered, and Washington’s 
relations with Moscow soured following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the onset 
of Ronald Reagan’s administration in the United States.8 Much less consideration has been 
given to the impact of Cold War covert propaganda in the context of decolonization inside the 
global South. Such activity on the part of the USSR, US and the UK complicated a commitment 
to non-alignment made by countries such as India.9 In addition, it acted as a source of friction 
in relations between the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain, at a point when all 
three countries were seeking to fashion more constructive ties following the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Over the course of a decade, that began with the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war 
in 1962, and culminated in the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971, India steadily disengaged from 
the West and tilted towards the Eastern bloc. In the process, New Delhi struggled to control 
diplomatic fallout from a covert propaganda war waged on its territory by the superpowers 
that, at times, appeared to imperil a reorientation of India’s foreign policy.  
Intelligence historians have noted elsewhere that Soviet intelligence activity in the 
decolonizing world invariably targeted the United States, as the Kremlin became progressively 
dismissive of British post-war power.10 India, as we shall see, represented an exception to this 
rule. Well into the 1960s, Moscow continued to direct major disinformation operations at 
vestiges of residual British power in the subcontinent. In so doing, the Soviet Union strove to 
diminish Whitehall’s sway with the Indian political and economic establishment and, by 
closely associating UK regional policy with that of its American ally, undermine wider Western 
influence in South Asia. The importance that the Kremlin hierarchy attached to such activity, 
and the close bureaucratic scrutiny under which it operated, was underlined in a contemporary 
CIA assessment. ‘Black propaganda is a function of the Bloc foreign intelligence services 
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under close direction from high Party echelons,’ American intelligence analysts concluded in 
1961. ‘It is possible that the entire Bloc show is directed by a unit of the CPSU Central 
Committee and run by the KGB through its liaison officers with other services.’11 
It is important to note that restrictions imposed by sovereign states on the declassification 
of intelligence records and, most especially, restrictions operating in contemporary Russia, 
make the sourcing of evidence in respect of foreign intelligence activity especially challenging.  
Conclusions derived from such material which, even when publicly disclosed, has first been 
subject to ‘weeding’, or selective curation by agents of the state, are necessarily contingent. In 
recent years, historians and political scientists have extended our understanding of post-war 
British covert operations.12 This work has added to the voluminous coverage previously given 
to American Cold War intelligence work.13 In contrast, official documents covering Soviet-era 
covert operations, and especially those conducted in the context of India, remain largely 
beyond the reach of researchers.14 Consequentially, much of the analysis of Soviet 
disinformation campaigns that follows is informed by British and American primary material. 
That said, an essential methodological leap in intelligence studies requires that material from 
the global South is linked to that from the Europe and North America to provide a more holistic 
picture of the impact and perceptions of British (and American) intelligence operations outside 
the Anglosphere.15 Such innovation, as international historians whose work has touched on 
intelligence matters have ably demonstrated, is now both possible and can be highly 
rewarding.16  
In part, this article employs recently released records from the National Archives of India 
and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Deli to recover the significance of 
hitherto neglected local actors in the history of a covert Cold War conflict waged in India. New 
Delhi evidenced a concerned, if not always entirely productive response to political warfare 
operations conducted by foreign powers inside its borders. Disquiet over the damage that the 
dissemination of disinformation and, in particular, the publication of forged documents 
smearing national governments could do to New Delhi’s relationships with international 
partners, ensured that India was never a passive player in the propaganda Cold War. Indian 
governments were acutely aware that covert disinformation activity conducted by third parties 
in the subcontinent complicated their efforts to retain invaluable economic assistance provided 
by the United States and, concurrently, pursue closer defence and security relations with the 
Soviet Union. Other scholars have documented the strain that global competition between 
Moscow and Washington, in fields as diverse as economics, grand strategy, and cultural 
diplomacy, placed on India’s policy of non-alignment.17 The intelligence Cold War in South 
Asia acted as a further, concomitant source of stress on New Delhi’s foreign policymaking, 
subverting India’s attempts to retain the goodwill and support of the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  
Back in early 1967, Chester Bowles had anticipated an upsurge in Communist propaganda 
in the subcontinent and, more specifically, an increase in Soviet disinformation designed to 
weaken American influence in India. Writing the previous November to the veteran US 
diplomat, Averell Harriman, he expressed the conviction that having recently suffered reverses 
elsewhere in Asia, and notably in Indonesia, following a military crackdown on the local 
communist party, the PKI, or Partai Komunis Indonesia, Moscow ‘almost surely will give 
India the highest priority.’ Moreover, Bowles reasoned that with the Sino-Soviet split 
widening, and India constituting ‘the only massive political balance to China in Asia’, it would 
become, ‘essential for the USSR to establish an effective, responsive Communist Party here 
[India] as an ideological base from which to operate with the other underdeveloped nations.’18 
For an Ambassador known to harbour ‘a visceral dislike of covert operations’, the Soviet black 
propaganda offensive in India proved especially irksome. Before Bowles’ posting to New 
Delhi, Desmond FitzGerald, who served as the CIA’s Deputy Director of Plans, ensured that 
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he was kept away from intelligence oversight while serving as Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs in the Kennedy administration. Extending Bowles authority over covert 
operations, Fitzgerald observed sardonically, would be akin to entrusting a ship to a captain 
who hated the sea.19 
The open appeal that Bowles directed at Soviet intelligence agencies through the American 
Reporter to, ‘Keep the Cold War Out of India’, was almost absurdly antiquated. The Indian 
subcontinent had a long and controversial association with covert intelligence activity. Back in 
the eighteenth-century, the British East India Company had developed sophisticated networks 
of local spies and propagandists to consolidate and extend its influence in South Asia.20 In turn, 
British colonial rule in India was, in no small part, facilitated by what one scholar has 
characterised as a ubiquitous and highly efficient imperial system of political surveillance and 
military intelligence.21 Reflecting on his experience serving in India at the height of the British 
Raj, one military officer recorded that, ‘there can never be any secrets in India, it is rather like 
living in an illuminated greenhouse.’22 Indeed, the British Empire itself, of which India came 
to represent the jewel in the crown, constituted a veritable ‘empire of intelligence’, whose very 
survival hinged on a capacity to obtain and process information on the social and political lives 
of its subjects.23 British intelligence officers worked assiduously not only to suppress the forces 
of local nationalism, but also to forestall Russian imperial encroachment into India. Lionised 
on the pages of fictional works penned by London’s preeminent imperial scribe, Rudyard 
Kipling, on the ground in the subcontinent, British and Russian officials secretly engaged in a 
‘Great Game’ for territory, power and prestige.24 The rise of the Soviet Union after the October 
revolution of 1917 did little to dampen Russian interest in India, and the ‘Great Game’ 
continued largely unabated up to, and beyond, Britain’s retreat from South Asia in August 
1947.25 
Indeed, following India’s independence, New Delhi’s policy of Cold War non-alignment 
facilitated the presence of sizable diplomatic and commercial missions in the country from both 
sides of the Iron Curtain. Moreover, the Cold War’s shifting geography all but guaranteed that 
India would play an important part in an updated variant of the ‘Great Game.’ Directly to the 
north of India lay the Communist colossuses of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of 
China. In 1955, an exchange of state visits between Indian’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
and the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, invigorated moribund bilateral relations. Economic 
and technical assistance began flowing into India from the USSR, while politically Moscow 
courted Indian favour by using its veto in the UN Security Council to support New Delhi’s 
claim on the disputed state of Kashmir.  
Equally, in the latter half of the 1950s, during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s second presidential 
term, Washington became alarmed by the expansion of Soviet influence in the subcontinent 
and the electoral success achieved by the Communist Party of India (CPI). By the end of the 
decade, CIA estimates placed the CPI’s membership at some 258,000, making it the fourth 
largest Communist Party outside the Eastern bloc.26 Above all, in 1957, the decision taken by 
Indian voters to return a CPI government in Kerala, in southern India, sent shockwaves through 
America’s political establishment.27 Efforts by Eisenhower’s administration to strengthen 
Indo-US relations, principally through the provision of economic assistance, were 
subsequently extended by President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy came to see India as a crucial 
democratic counterweight to communist power in Asia. For the majority of Kennedy’s 
truncated presidency and, most evidently, for a brief period following the Sino–Indian border 
war of 1962, Washington’s effort to contain Asian communism was not focused on South 
Vietnam, but on South Asia.28  
Inevitably, the importance attached to India by the Soviet Union and the United States 
ensured that foreign intelligence agencies were highly active in the subcontinent.29 The former 
British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officer, and Soviet spy, George Blake, recorded that 
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India was valued in Western intelligence circles as it offered, ‘the most favourable 
conditions…for establishing contacts with Soviet citizens.’30 The presence in India of large 
numbers of diplomats, non-governmental organisations, technicians, businesspeople, and 
journalists from the USSR, UK, and the United States, offered considerable scope for the covert 
acquisition of information, the dissemination of black propaganda, and the recruitment of 
agents and defectors. It was in New Delhi, in the 1960s, that Stella Rimington, a future Director 
General of the British Security Service (MI5) was inducted into the secret world. Recruited as 
an assistant to the local MI5 representative, or Security Liaison Officer (SLO), Rimington 
discovered that, ‘the battle for influence or control in India which had been waged between 
Russia and Britain since the 19th century continued.’ The subcontinent, Rimington marvelled, 
‘was overrun with foreign advisers, military advisers, agricultural advisers, industrial advisers, 
economic advisers and every other kind of adviser you can imagine. As we toured the country 
we kept falling over them.’31 
What applied to SIS and MI5, also held good for America’s Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), and Eastern bloc intelligence bodies, including the Soviet Committee for State Security 
(KGB) and foreign military intelligence (GRU), and the overseas arms of East German and 
Czech intelligence. From 1947, the CIA began to establish a substantial operational presence 
in India. Beginning with a single ‘station,’ or office, in New Delhi, the Agency steadily 
extended the geographical scope of its activities, establishing a network of outposts in Bombay, 
Calcutta, and Madras. One American official assigned to New Delhi in the 1960s, confirmed 
that US intelligence involvement in India was, ‘very large, and very invasive . . . the CIA was 
deeply involved in the Indian Government.’32 Before taking up his post as Kennedy’s 
ambassador in India, a CIA briefing on covert operations left the Harvard economist, John 
Kenneth Galbraith, ‘appalled and depressed’. Galbraith reasoned that Agency plans to channel 
millions of dollars to non-communist Indian politicians, subsidise pro-Western Indian 
journalists and newspapers, and violate Indian airspace in support of Tibetan dissidents 
resisting Chinese rule, were likely to be ineffective, subject to public exposure, and prove 
politically incendiary. Incensed by what decried as reckless ‘adventurism’, the Ambassador 
waged a campaign to shut down CIA operations. Galbraith’s efforts to circumscribe Agency 
activity proved to be, at best, only partially successful.33 
Concurrently, a succession of dynamic KGB chairman, such as Alexander Shelepin, 
Vladimir Semichastny, and the future Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, zealously prosecuted 
Moscow’s strategy of sponsoring wars of national liberation and undercutting Western 
influence across the global South.34 On Andropov’s watch, Soviet intelligence agencies 
expended a sizable proportion of their resources, outside of Europe and North America, in 
India.35 Oleg Kalugin, then a rising star in the KGB’s First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) 
Directorate, has documented that the Soviets ‘had scores of sources throughout the Indian 
government – in intelligence, counterintelligence, the defense and foreign ministries, and the 
police. The entire country was seemingly for sale, and the KGB and the CIA had deeply 
penetrated the Indian government.’36  
British counter-subversion officers from MI5, who provided the Indian Intelligence Bureau 
(IB) with training and advice, became ‘depressed’ by the inability of their colleagues in the 
subcontinent to recognize and respond effectively to threats posed by an explosion in the Soviet 
intelligence presence. One disgruntled MI5 officer grumbled in the mid-1960s that, when it 
came to India, ‘in effect they [the Soviets] are having an almost free run for their money both 
in the espionage and subversive fields.’37 Echoing the concerns expressed by British 
colleagues, the CIA warned American policymakers that the Soviets ‘intensive propaganda’ 
programmes in the subcontinent underscored that, ‘India has [a] high priority in the Kremlin’s 
program to destroy Western prestige in the underdeveloped countries.’38 The deep and 
pervasive nature of external intelligence operations in India has been corroborated by members 
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of New Delhi’s own security and intelligence services. T. V. Rajeswar, a former director of 
India’s Intelligence Bureau, has noted that the subcontinent was an especially ‘happy hunting 
ground for intelligence agencies from all over the world.’39 
 
Soviet Disinformation and Forgery in India 
 
Reflecting on his service as the first head of the CIA’s Soviet division, and the Agency’s station 
chief in New Delhi between 1957 and 1962, Harry Rositzke opined that, ‘the most effective 
form of KGB disinformation work is the forgery and distribution of  “genuine” documents 
from inside the U.S. Government to highlight its aggressive intentions and interventionist 
policies... these forgeries have had the greatest impact in the Third World, both on government 
elites and on public opinion.’40 The belief that the Global South was especially vulnerable to 
Soviet disinformation operations was widely held inside the CIA. An Agency report from 
March 1960 observed that the ‘effectiveness’ of forgery campaigns depended largely on the 
geographic area targeted. ‘In politically sophisticated areas such as Western Europe the forged 
“secret document” has been so heavily used by generations of secret police and political 
extremists…that any “disclosure of secret documents,” true or false, is apt to be greeted with 
public scepticism,’ Agency analysts concluded. ‘In the underdeveloped areas, however, the 
level of political sophistication is low and the forgeries undoubtedly find some acceptance…’ 
Brushing over broader geo-strategic drivers underpinning the expansion of Cold War 
propaganda activity beyond Europe, the increasing frequency with which Eastern bloc 
intelligence services had targeted ‘the underdeveloped areas of the world’, it was argued, 
validated such an thesis.41 The orientalist attitude to disinformation activity that permeated the 
CIA, in an Indian context, at least, was deeply flawed. Ample exposure to colonial propaganda, 
allied to a vibrant and adversarial political culture, as we shall see, led Indians and their 
nationalist leaders to approach black propaganda conducted through forgery with a healthy 
degree of scepticism and suspicion.  
Less problematic, was Rositzke’s identification of India as a major focus for Soviet 
disinformation activity. Forgeries purporting to be official State Department documents 
featured regularly in left-wing news magazines, such as Blitz and Link. Such ‘fake news’ was 
placed in India’s mainstream media in ‘a hundred ways.’ Local KGB agents and compliant 
news editors, Soviet contacts in diplomatic, academic and government circles, and journalists 
and publications benefiting from covert financial subsidies, were all employed to surface 
forged texts. Once published in India, stories based on forgeries were picked up and replayed 
by other countries through regular press sources, carried in the Soviet print media via TASS 
and Izvestia, and broadcast over Radio Moscow. The process did not only benefit Eastern bloc 
propagandists. Many Indians with little, or no, ideological affinity for either side in the Cold 
War, proved more than willing to take advantage of Soviet and American largesse. In the late 
1950s, when bemoaning an attempt to place articles in the Indian press, one East German 
official complained that the Delhi Times had agreed to publish unattributable material from 
behind the Iron Curtain, but only in return for generous financial compensation.42 
Curiously, back in 1952, Chester Bowles had been one of the first to fall victim to a 
Communist forgery ploy in India. The year before, Bowles had been posted to New Delhi by 
Harry Truman to serve his first stint as US Ambassador. On 30 September, Current, a Mumbai 
news magazine, published a photostat of letter purported written by Bowles to Russi K. 
Karanjia, the editor of Blitz. In the letter, which Bowles decried as a ‘bare-faced forgery’, the 
Ambassador was quoted as expressing a willingness to meet secretly, and work with, Indian 
Communists.43 An irate Bowles successfully lobbied the Indian government to open an enquiry 
into the incident. Also unhappy at ‘slanderous’ attacks levelled at his government by Blitz, and 
other Communist  publications, India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, accepted advice 
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from his officials to, ‘consider whether something should not be done to stop or counteract this 
type of malevolent press propaganda which we, Ministers and Secretaries alike, must all 
deplore.’44 However, perhaps as its authors had intended, the US Ambassador’s determination 
to get to the bottom of the forgery episode backfired. Citing the sanctity of journalist’s sources, 
D. F. Karaka, the editor of Current, refused to reveal how he had come by the forged document. 
Karaka and Karanjia were arrested by Indian authorities on charges of forgery and wilful 
publication of forged documents. In a drama that the Indian press ensured received blanket 
coverage, the editors were acquitted by a Mumbai court, and then promptly rearrested by local 
police in a legal saga that dragged on for months. Ultimately, the origin of the forgery remained 
obscure. What became clearer, however, was that support Bowles and his Embassy had accrued 
in the Indian press immediately following the forgery’s publication, turned to irritation and 
open hostility, as the United States’ attempt to obtain legal redress became associated, fairly or 
not, with an assault on the freedom of the press in the subcontinent.45 
Under Karanjia’s direction, Blitz proved to be a considerable thorn in the side of Western 
governments. The British denounced the magazine as ‘a scurrilous, sensational type of paper, 
edited by an unscrupulous Parsae [sic]…whose reputation is that of a fellow-traveller, if not a 
Communist.’46 One former CIA officer confirmed that Blitz was regarded as a Soviet-
controlled, ‘tabloid “rag” of propaganda and disinformation… which had influence beyond 
India, and … preoccupied us considerably.’47 Specifically, Blitz was identified by the CIA as 
one of the most prominent vehicles for the replay of Soviet forgeries, alongside the East 
German newspaper, Neues Deutschland, and the Cairo daily, Al Ahram. Karanjia, although 
assiduous in eschewing association with local Communists, was personally marked out by the 
Agency as an, ‘obvious…Soviet bloc…propaganda agent.’ Labelled by the CIA as a ‘silent 
partner’, or controller of a news outlet acting as a vehicle for ultranationalist and pro-Soviet 
propaganda, Karanjia cultivated a wide circle of contacts in Indian politics, the media, and 
amongst foreign diplomats. These, the Agency concluded, were utilised by Karanjia, ‘for the 
purposes of verbal promotion of rumour, picking up libellous gossip for replay to a member of 
his newspapers staff (posing as an informant on the owner), to local police and foreign 
intelligence agencies...’48 
Over the course of just a few months in late 1957 and early 1958, Blitz carried no fewer than 
eight prominent stories centred on the exposure of purportedly genuine US government 
documents. In July 1957, a forged State Department directive was reproduced in which the US 
Ambassador to Thailand, Max Waldo Bishop, appeared to receive instructions to use local US 
intelligence facilities ‘to screen the loyalty of the [Thai] King and his Government members.’ 
On 21 September, two forged cables allegedly sent by the US Ambassador in Taiwan, Karl 
Rankin, were printed. In these, Rankin was seen to discuss methods of assassinating the 
Chinese nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek. The Rankin ‘cables’ were subsequently replayed 
over Radio Peking, in broadcasts beamed into Taiwan. A week later, Blitz featured copies of a 
further two forged cables from the US Ambassador to Jakarta, John Allison. On this occasion, 
the forgeries outlined American plans to aid rebels in overthrowing Indonesia’s President 
Sukarno. Further stories based on forged US government documents followed in quick 
succession. Among these, Blitz detailed Washington’s supposed support for post-Suez Israeli 
plans to annex Arab territory; the existence of a secret US-Japanese pact to deploy Japanese 
combat forces on the Asian mainland; an American intention to use SEATO to secure control 
of Asian nations armed forces; disclosures of Communist sympathies within the Nationalist 
Chinese military; and further moves by Eisenhower’s administration to coopt Taiwan and the 
Philippines in subverting Indonesia’s government. At times, Blitz appeared to coordinate the 
publication of forgeries with the Delhi Times, a newspaper dismissed by the CIA as another 
‘chronic purveyor of Bloc propaganda’, and ‘a second-rate imitation’ of its Mumbai 
counterpart. The Delhi Times was heavily subsidised by Eastern European, or ‘Bloc friendly’, 
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missions in India. These accounted for purchases of up to half the newspapers print run, 
amounting to between 3,000 and 5,000 copies. In turn, material showcased in the Indian 
newspaper frequently reappeared days, or weeks later, in the wider Asian Communist press, 
such as La Patrie [The Homeland], a weekly published in Bangkok, and in Djakarta, through 
Berita Mingu [Sunday News]. 49 
The CIA, along with  colleagues in the British Information Research Department (IRD), a 
shadowy secret propaganda arm of the Foreign Office, with close links to SIS, followed Blitz’s 
contribution to a ‘progressive increase in [the Soviets] use of forgery as a propaganda weapon’, 
with some apprehension. Although the Indian publications weekly circulation of around 30,000 
copies remained relatively small, its focus was not on mass propaganda. Rather, as American 
intelligence officers underlined, Blitz’s impact resided in providing, ‘a rallying point in drawing 
together and guiding the propaganda of small, non-Communist, political, theological and 
pacifist organisations in the area [India].’50 Indeed, the ‘noticeable increase’ in Soviet black 
propaganda-by-forgery at the end of the 1950s, which saw 32 known cases recorded, and in 
which Blitz featured heavily in both surfacing and replaying counterfeit documents, led the 
CIA to launch an ‘intensive investigation’ into the scope, scale, and impact of such an 
unwelcome development.51 Marvelling at the surge in forgery output, wags in the CIA 
headquarters at Langley, Virginia, reasoned that such tireless work on the part of Soviet 
intelligence officers had undoubtedly resulted in the creation of ‘some Heroes of Socialist 
Forgery.’ More troublingly, CIA analysts identified a new trend which suggested that Soviet 
forgery activity had been honed into a propaganda tool capable of quickly and efficiently 
responding to shifts in East-West relations. In the months prior to the abortive Paris summit, 
scheduled to take place in May 1960, between the leaders of the US, USSR, Britain and France, 
a ‘damping’ in the number of Soviet forgeries occurred. Between the acrimonious collapse of 
the summit, and the American presidential election the following November, the appearance 
of Soviet forgeries increased sevenfold, and on a clockwork schedule of one new forgery per 
month.52 
The uptick in Soviet disinformation prompted Richard Helms, then Assistant Director of the 
CIA, to testify before a Senate Subcommittee on the subject of ‘Communist Forgeries.’ 
Appearing on Capitol Hill in June 1961, Helms outlined a Communist propaganda menace to 
American interests that ‘grows daily more intense’. Helms asserted that, ‘the Russians have a 
long tradition in the art of forgery’, that stretched back to the czarist intelligence service, and 
its work in concocting anti-Semitic fabrications, such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. 
More recently, the Assistant Director declared, Moscow had begun, ‘to aim them [forgeries] 
frequently against American targets, to turn them out in volume and to exploit them through a 
wide-flung international network.’ In the vanguard of Soviet efforts, ‘to drive a wedge between 
the peoples of non-bloc countries and their governments’ by employing ‘a bible of libel’, 
Helms noted, were “Charley McCarthys”, or dummies parroting the words of others, typified 
by nominally free world newspapers, such as Blitz, that were ‘consistently used as an outlet for 
Communist propaganda.’ Listing detailed examples of a string of forgeries published in Blitz, 
Helms emphasised the CIA’s determination to continue publicly exposing communist 
fabrications. ‘The more lies we skin and nail to the door for all the world to see, the more aware 
the audience will be that the bloc lies, how it lies, and why it lies,’ Helms submitted. ‘As the 
bloc’s chief propagandist [Nikita Khrushchev] told us not so long ago, they expect to bury us 
– in forgeries, apparently.’53  
When gauging reactions to Helms’ testimony, the CIA concluded that it had served a 
valuable purpose in exposing the Communist technique of forgery to a wider domestic and 
international audience, and would prove a useful point of reference for American diplomats 
when they had cause to broach the issue of Soviet disinformation with their host governments. 
With Helms’ encouragement, Leonard Marks, Director of the USIA, produced a booklet 
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designed for foreign distribution, that was based on the forgery material disclosed in the Senate 
Subcommittee hearings.54 The fact that Helms’ intervention was not subject to greater 
counterattack in the global Communist press was interpreted as further evidence of its impact. 
The weight and detail contained within the cases of forgery outlined by its Assistant Director, 
the Agency reasoned, suggested communists judged that it would be ‘distinctly unprofitable’ 
to subject the testimony to open challenge. One of the only public ripostes came from Karanjia 
who, CIA officers reported with satisfaction, had confined criticism of Helms’ attack on Blitz 
to the limp assertion that, ‘…the contents, if not the documents themselves [published by his 
newspaper], stood corroborated by exposures of CIA activities…’55  
 
India’s Year of Intelligence 
 
As the 1960s progressed, the CIA’s counter-offensive against Soviet black propaganda that 
had been launched by Helms was compromised by unwelcome ghosts from the Agency’s past. 
Notably, in February 1967, Langley was aghast when the American west-coast magazine, 
Ramparts, revealed that the CIA had funded a global network of educational and cultural 
organisations. In exposés that were reprinted in The New York Times and The Washington Post, 
Ramparts laid bare the Agency’s covert funding of bodies such as the National Students 
Association, Asia Foundation, and Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). In India, where a 
general election campaign was underway, a wave of popular rancour greeted the disclosure 
that the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, an offshoot of the CCF, had been bankrolled 
by the CIA. Chester Bowles noted presciently that repercussions from the Ramparts calamity 
would be keenly felt in in India, ‘where we [the United States] had developed especially close 
and extensive relationships with Indian universities and with individual scholars, none of which 
were in any way connected with intelligence operations.’56  
Matters went from bad to worse the following month when, in an article carried by The 
Washington Post, John Kenneth Galbraith derided the CIA as, ‘a secret agency . . . with an 
excellent instinct for headlines.’ In publicly recounting his interactions with the Agency in the 
subcontinent, Galbraith claimed that CIA ‘activities were generally known to, and involved no 
conflict with, local [Indian government] authorities.’57 Infuriated by Galbraith’s imprudence, 
Helms, by now the Agency’s Director, fumed that the former Ambassador had succeeded in 
‘rais[ing] unshirted hell in India and [had] . . . provided the central point of an acrimonious 
debate in the Lok Sabha [India’s parliament].’58  At the same time, a pamphlet appeared in 
India authored by John D. Smith, a former code clerk at the US Embassy in New Delhi, who 
had taken up residence in the Soviet Union. First serialized in Moscow’s Literaturnaya Gazeta, 
Smith’s scurrilous tract, I was a CIA Agent in India, detailed purported Agency machinations 
designed to subvert the Indian government. Smith’s allegations included a claim that the CIA 
had sabotaged an Air India flight carrying Chinese diplomats to the Bandung conference in 
1955. Derided as a ludicrous fabrication by Western officials, and subject to an IRD counter-
propaganda campaign all of its own, Smith’s book nevertheless amplified many Indians’ 
misgivings surrounding US encroachment in the subcontinent’s political affairs.59 In turn, 
sensing an opportunity to stoke public outrage and secure votes, India’s politicians evidenced 
an increasingly anti-CIA posture. On March 23, India’s Foreign Minister, M. C. Chagla, 
declared that a ‘thorough’ official investigation would be launched to determine the extent of 
CIA interference in India’s domestic affairs. ‘We cannot permit foreigners or foreign 
governments to dictate to us what sort of a government we should have or what sort of people 
should be elected,’ Chagla announced. ‘We will unearth any activity that is objectionable, that 
is against the national interests.’60 
Anxiety that an anti-CIA witch hunt in India would expose Britain’s own covert propaganda 
operations, the British High Commissioner in New Delhi, John Freeman, suspended some local 
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IRD activity.61 A journalist by trade, Freeman had been sent to India in 1965 by the Labour 
Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. He was quickly embroiled in a diplomatic spat with his host 
government, after Wilson angered Indians by appearing to blame New Delhi for escalating a 
conflict that had broken out with Pakistan in the autumn of that year. Freeman confided to the 
Labour cabinet minister, Tony Benn, that Moscow was actively working to exploit Indo-British 
discord, and aggressively pursuing a, ‘Russian interest…to disengage the British from India.’62 
Back in London, IRD officials echoed Freeman’s concern ‘that [the] Russians are now stepping 
up disinformation activities.’ Much of the Soviet covert propaganda output, the British rued, 
evidenced ‘rather an I.R.D. character’, and had taken to employing ‘unconscious or semi-
conscious “agents of influence”’, encompassing both journalists and politicians, who worked 
within local laws and were frustratingly ‘difficult to pin anything on.’63 
Freeman was mindful that a public unmasking of IRD’s own illegal use of unattributable 
propaganda in India would spark a political storm. Worst still, disclosure of Britain’s recourse 
to ‘black’ propaganda in the subcontinent, including the distribution of forged documents 
smearing communists, was likely to have major diplomatic repercussions. Back in May 1962, 
the British had been placed in an awkward position when MI5’s SLO in New Delhi was 
approached by the Indian Intelligence Bureau regarding a suspicious document then circulating 
in the country, that purported to originate with the Secretariat of the Chinese People’s 
Committee for World Peace, based in Beijing. The British SLO recognised the document 
immediately as an IRD forgery, on which he had been briefed back in London prior to his 
posting to India. In an effort to mask its true origin, the British MI5 officer was advised by the 
Security Service and IRD to ‘deny all knowledge’ of the forged document and, in a remarkable 
display of bravado, offer to examine the document for the IB and provide an expert, and 
disingenuous, ‘expert opinion’ on its veracity.64 
In this context, the events of 1967 saw Freeman order IRD field officers not to recruit new 
Indian contacts; to avoid interaction with established ‘assets’; and to exercise extreme caution 
in the payment of monetary ‘incentives.’ Freeman’s decision to ‘pause’ IRD work was driven 
by the concern that the Indian scrutiny of the CIA might, ‘unearth the activities of other 
Western Missions and perhaps link these with the C.I.A. Here we [the British] should be an 
obvious target.’ Moreover, an Indian shift to the left, that saw Communist-led state 
governments installed in Kerala and West Bengal, raised British concerns that, ‘the spread of 
communist influence is now likely to enter the field of Indian domestic politics, and...in the 
process, the ability of the State Governments to uncover—or fabricate—‘foreign influences’ is 
of course increased.’65 Worryingly for the British, the heightened Indian interest shown in the 
CIA did translate into questions on the organisation and role played by the United Kingdom’s 
foreign intelligence services. At diplomatic reception held just after the Ramparts story broke, 
Freeman was startled when, Triloki Nath Kaul, India’s Secretary at the Ministry of External 
Affairs, directed ‘a sharp question’ in his direction, asking the High Commissioner pointedly, 
“What is the British equivalent of the C.I.A.?”. The same question was repeated by a second 
Indian at a lunch hosted by Britain’s Information Counsellor a few days later. ‘We do not want 
to read too much into Kaul’s behaviour,’ the British High Commission advised London, ‘but 
it certainly shows the way in which his mind, for whatever practical objectives, tends to 
work.’66 Freeman’s apprehension that intelligence scandals spelt trouble for Western interests 
in India, were well founded. What the British High Commissioner failed to anticipate, however, 
was that he would be personally placed at the centre of a Soviet disinformation ploy. 
 
The Freeman Telegram 
 
On 9 February 1967, as the Ramparts revelations were about to be aired in America’s press, 
John Freeman sent an urgent cable from New Delhi to Whitehall. Freeman reported that a 
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friendly local journalist, Frank Moraes, from the Indian Express, had passed the British High 
Commission a photostat copy of a purportedly secret telegram. The telegram in question, which 
was addressed from Freeman to London, named members of the US Embassy staff in Delhi, 
and suggested that they were involved in passing covert payments to pro-American Indian 
parliamentarians and right-wing political party’s campaigning against the ruling Congress 
government in national elections. ‘Although there are sufficient fallacies to convince any 
sophisticated reader of its real nature,’ Freeman noted, ‘it [the telegram] could certainly 
confuse and probably deceive those who are uninitiated in our professional ways.’ Alarmed 
that the cable would be cited by an India media highly sensitized to allegations of American 
interference in the nation’s domestic affairs, and subsequently replayed by Soviet 
propagandists, Freeman rushed to forewarn American colleagues, and officials at India’s 
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), that a forged document was circulating within the 
pressrooms of Indian newspapers.67 Anticipating the telegrams appearance in Blitz, Freeman 
agreed with American counterparts that, on its publication, they would issue a common 
statement  confirming, ‘that the telegram is a blatant and crude forgery, and that we have been 
in touch with the Indian Government about it.’68 
The British inclination was to let the matter rest there, and ‘to treat the whole incident 
lightly… and to take the line, when questioned, that the forgery is too clumsy to be taken at all 
seriously.’69 The US Embassy elected to take a more combative approach. A draft statement 
prepared by America officials attacked the forgery as, ‘a contemptible and unskillful attempt 
to blacken the name of the U.S. and to influence the course of the Indian elections.’70 
Attempting to seize the initiative, and blunt the impact of the telegrams publication, Bowles, 
accompanied by Leonard Weiss, his Minister Counsellor, called on Lakshmi Kant Jha, head of 
the Indian Prime Ministers secretariat, and an individual not unsympathetic to the United 
States. Making clear in the strongest terms that Washington was losing patience with the 
appearance of forgeries maligning the United States, Bowles advised Jha that he was in 
possession of information that pointed to Soviet involvement in a disinformation campaign 
being mounted in India. Furthermore, the American Ambassador named Yuri Modin, recently 
arrived as Consul at Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, and known as intelligence officer, as behind 
the latest forgeries. Intriguingly, in the 1950s, Modin had served as Soviet controller of the 
‘Cambridge Five’ spy ring, whose British members included Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, 
Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross. Confirming that his Embassy intended to 
‘make a public row if this sort of thing continued’, Bowles pointedly asked Jha how an 
unsavory diplomatic squabble between the United States and Soviet Union, centered on India, 
might best be avoided? Anxious that India was not drawn into a dispute between the two 
superpowers, Jha arranged for American officials to meet for talks with colleagues in the 
Ministries of External and Home Affairs.71 
Weiss wasted no time in calling at the MEA to raise the matter directly with K.S. Bajpai, 
Director of its American Section. Bajpai’s notes of the encounter record Weiss’s ‘irritation and 
concern’ at the scale of forgeries published in the Indian press, and their intention to poison 
Washington’s relations with New Delhi. Assuring Bajpai that he was ‘convinced beyond all 
doubts that the Soviet Union was behind the distribution of these forgeries’, Weiss reiterated 
that, ‘if this practice were continued there would be a first-class row as the Americans would 
have to issue statements and there might be a running exchange between them and the 
Russians.’ Weiss’s intervention had little impact inside the MEA which, accurately or not, was 
generally perceived by Western embassies as difficult to deal with, if not overtly pro-Soviet. 
Although acknowledging ‘the evident working up of emotions among the Missions accused of 
wrong doing’, Bajpai asked what, precisely, the US Embassy expected his government to do? 
In the absence of incontrovertible evidence of Soviet involvement, Bajpai made clear to Weiss 
that, ‘obviously we [the MEA] could not send for the Russians and say the Americans had told 
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us that the USSR was conducting this campaign.’ Equally, a disgruntled Weiss was informed 
that, given the operation of a free press in India, ‘if there were politically committed papers 
wanting to discredit Western countries, there was little we [the Indian government] could do 
to stop them.’ Unsatisfied, Weiss pressed Bajpai to intervene, and to order Blitz not to publish 
the Freeman telegram. In response the Indian official observed that his American colleague, 
‘would surely appreciate the unlikelihood of Mr. Karanjia taking any advice from the 
Government of India.’ To Bajpai’s surprise, a piqued Weiss ended their encounter by stating 
that he was seeing India’s Home Secretary later that day, and would revisit the issue of the 
Freeman telegram at a more senior level of the Indian government.72 
The American conviction that the Freeman telegram was the work of Soviet intelligence 
was not shared by British colleagues. The IRD concluded that the forger was more likely to be 
an Indian Communist than an Eastern Bloc propagandist. In large part, the British position was 
informed by the poor quality of the forgery. Officials in the British High Commission recorded 
that IRD officers were, ‘reluctant to believe that a Soviet Intelligence Officer could have been 
so clumsy.’73 Although the British reasoned that the forgery ‘was  obviously made by someone 
in possession of a duplicated telegram of some kind in the Foreign Office/Whitehall 
distribution’, it did contain a number of mistakes. Freeman was named as ‘Sir John Freeman’ 
in the cable. The High Commissioner had not been ennobled. The telegram was also addressed 
from ‘Delhi’ to the ‘Foreign Office’, when an official British communication from India would 
have been addressed from ‘New Delhi’ to the ‘Commonwealth Office’. In addition, to the 
horror of Whitehall, the telegram was full of errors of grammar, and written in a ‘noticeably 
"un-English''’ style.74 Joe Garner, Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Commonwealth 
Office, found the Freeman forgery to be ‘fascinating’, but did wonder why Communist forgers 
‘imagine that we [British diplomats] still write in the style of Gibbon?’75 
As the British and Americans had suspected, the Freeman telegram did feature in Blitz, but 
not in the form anticipated. On 18 February, the Indian newspaper published a report by A. 
Raghavan, its Delhi correspondent, alleging that a ‘British source’ had confirmed the High 
Commission were concerned about covert American financing of right-wing Indian politicians 
and political parties, and Washington’s interference in India’s elections. The Freeman telegram 
itself, however, was not directly cited or reproduced.76 The British judged that the strength of 
the American reaction communicated to the Indian government had filtered through to Blitz, 
and led its editor to take a more circumspect approach than normal to the publication of a 
forgery. In addition, American officials determined that the forgers had made a fundamental 
mistake in naming specific Indians in the telegram, and opening up the prospect of litigation 
against newspapers that reproduced the full text. ‘It seems probable that whoever prepared it 
[the Freeman telegram] failed to understand the Rule of Law as it is applied in India,’ Bowles’ 
staff suspected, ‘particularly the law of libel and slander. For it is one thing falsely to say that 
the American Embassy has paid rupees to “anti-socialist candidates” and quite another to say 
that the recipients with C.B. Gupta, Minoo Masani and Atulya Ghosh [Indian Members of 
Parliament].’77 
Having consulted with American colleagues, British officials persuaded the US Embassy to 
change tack, and temper reactions to the Blitz article and, if deemed necessary, to issue separate 
protests to avoid Communist charges of Western collusion in covering up an embarrassing 
revelation. Eager to avoid placing themselves in the Indian media spotlight any more than was 
necessary until after national elections had concluded, the British and American missions also 
aimed to deny Blitz the oxygen of publicity. ‘A public denial,’ British officials judged, ‘would 
merely widen the article's readership.’ Relieved that the mainstream India press had declined 
to reproduce or comment on the Blitz allegation, the British did note that Raghavan’s report 
was replayed over Radio Moscow. ‘In [the] eyes of Americans here this confirms Soviet 
involvement in the forgery,’ a still skeptical Freeman informed London. ‘[The] United States 
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Embassy are therefore more concerned to nail the Russians than Blitz, and will be making 
recommendations to State Department in this broader context.’78 
The more circumspect British approach to the forgery was underlined when Freeman met 
with Chandra Shekhar Jha, India’s Foreign Secretary, towards the end of the month. Both men 
skirted around the forgery issue, declining to speculate on its precise origin. The British record 
of the encounter confirmed that, ‘though the Soviet Embassy was evidently in the minds of 
both, it was not mentioned by name.’ In contrast, the High Commission became aware that 
Bowles and his Embassy had reconsidered their position, and had gone back on to the offensive. 
‘The Americans make no bones of the fact that they have not been so reticent,’ one of 
Freeman’s staff reflected, ‘and in talks with Indian Government officials have openly accused 
the Russians of being responsible for this forgery and other malicious anti-American 
propaganda.’79 Galen Stone, Counselor at the US Embassy, kept pressure on the Indian 
government by paying regular visits to Bajpai at the MEA, and leaving the Indian official with 
lengthy and detailed reports of what the Americans categorized as, ‘a major campaign in India 
based on forgeries, the mailing of unattributable propaganda, and the printing of wholly 
baseless articles in the press.’ The, ‘bald faced effort to create discord between India and the 
United States’, Stone emphasised, seemed to have negatively affected the opinions of ‘a 
number of influential Indians’. ‘If it is permitted to go unchecked and unchallenged,’ Bajpai 
was warned, ‘the damage [to Indo-US relations] will become serious.’80 
The long litany of Communist forgeries passed on to Bajpai from the US Embassy included 
a disinformation campaign centred on a purported American plot to balkanize the east of the 
country, and create a ‘United States of Bengal’, by carving out territory from India and 
Pakistan. Another Communist back propaganda scheme, labelled ‘Project Brahmaputra’, 
focused on an alleged scheme to secretly promote US influence in eastern India. Forged 
documents claiming to establish the veracity of each, Bajpai was reminded, had surfaced in 
India Communist newspapers, including Patriot, Link and Mainstream, before being taken up 
in the Soviet press by Pravda. During 1967, however, the ‘major effort’ to blight Washington 
relationship with New Delhi, and influence the outcome of India’s general election, US reports 
underscored, had remained the ‘superficially plausible’ Freeman telegram. Ominously, Bajpai 
was left in no doubt by senior American diplomats that, ‘Unless the Indian authorities move 
promptly and effectively to trace and suppress this extensive clandestine propaganda apparatus, 
one may anticipate a continuation of this type of activity with a resultant adverse effect upon 
relations between India and the United States.’81 
 
‘Did the KGB Forge the Freeman Telegram?’ 
 
Throughout the remainder of 1967, and beyond, Bowles’ Embassy maintained pressure on the 
Indian government to adopt a more robust response to instances of disinformation-by-forgery. 
In May, as part of a public offensive that the American ambassador had initiated himself, with 
the publication of his article in the American Reporter, Tony Lukas, the New York Times’ 
correspondent in the Indian capital, was encouraged to approach the British with a view to 
running a story on the Freeman telegram. By way of introduction, John Shirley, the US 
Embassy press attaché, briefed British officials that Bowles was eager to assist the Western 
press in exposing, ‘the numerous anti-American activities at present rife in India.’ The British, 
whose relations with New Delhi had yet to recover from the nadir occasioned by Harold 
Wilson’s ill-judged intervention in the Indo-Pakistan war two years earlier, remained less keen 
to ruffle Indian feathers by making a fuss over the Freeman affair. Over ‘a very long 
conversation’ with Lukas, British officials stressed that they ‘had no particular wish for 
extensive publicity about this matter’, and declined to show the American reporter a copy of 
the Freeman forgery. Disturbed that, in briefing Lukas, the US Embassy had ‘injudiciously’ 
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provided the New York Times’ correspondent with a copy of the Blitz report on the Freeman 
cable, and speculated on the Soviet provenance of the forgery, the British stonewalled his 
questions. Asked directly by Lukas if the High Commission concurred with Bowles’ position 
that, ‘these forgeries and the type of propaganda they peddled were likely to increase in the 
future…[and] that the Russians specifically wanted to "carry the cold war into India"’, the 
British responded with an icy, ‘no comment.’82 Uncomfortably for the British, in a report 
published in the New York Times on 6 May, Lukas highlighted the Freeman forgery, referenced 
his contact with the High Commission, and underscored Bowles’ concern that the United States 
respond vigorously to a, ‘well organised [Communist] campaign to blacken the United States’ 
reputation here [India].’83 
Meanwhile, Galen Stone continued to furnish the MEA with American reports of Soviet 
disinformation activity in India. One report sent to Bajpai listed a further series of instances 
where Radio Moscow, and its sister station, Radio Peace and Progress, had directed broadcasts 
at India which repeated ‘slanderous untruths’ about specific American Embassy personnel, 
Peace Corps volunteers, and Indian public figures known to be friendly to the West. On 8 June, 
Radio Moscow lambasted the United States and the United Kingdom as, ‘the enemies of the 
Indian people, that is, those overseas powers which would like to see India made a colony once 
again.’ A sharp increase in the volume of Soviet disinformation reaching India led to questions 
being raised in the Indian parliament. On 8 August, India’s Deputy Minister of External Affairs 
took the unusual step of publicly criticising incidents of ‘very critical’ broadcasts emanating 
from the Soviet Union.84  
In December, the Indian government found itself further enmeshed in the forgery 
melodrama. During a debate on the activities of foreign espionage agencies held in the upper 
house of India’s parliament, the Rajya Sabha, S. S. Bhandari, an MP from the Jana Sangh, a 
right-wing political party, responded to charges of CIA subversion levelled by CPI colleagues 
by raising the spectre of Soviet  disinformation, and quoting extensively from the Freeman 
telegram. With the Freeman cable now the subject of Indian political discourse, the British 
High Commission felt compelled to issue a formal note decrying the telegram as a forgery. The 
British démenti was splashed over the front pages of India’s newspapers the next day. When 
questioned on the telegram in parliament, India’s Home Minister, Yashwantrao Balwantrao 
Chavan, confirmed that it was an obvious fabrication, and stated that he, ‘would not hesitate to 
prosecute the persons responsible for the forgery.’ The British welcomed Chavan’s 
intervention as ‘very satisfactory’. It had been informed by material that Freeman’s officials 
had supplied to the MEA for just such a purpose. ‘We have always found the Home Minister 
[Chavan] helpful in our dealings with him,’ the British crowed. ‘It is encouraging that he went 
out of his way to kill this story, and we should be surprised if any attempt were now made to 
revive it.’85 
At the same time, Bowles looked to sustain an Indian focus on Soviet disinformation, and 
deflect local media attention away from the CIA. Reentering the public debate on Cold War 
propaganda, the US Ambassador published a second excoriating attack on Moscow’s conduct 
in the American Reporter. On 18 December, Bowles addressed an open letter to the editor of 
Radio Peace and Progress, in which he lambasted ‘hostile’ broadcasts slandering himself, 
American officials working in India, and the US government more broadly. ‘According to your 
broadcasts,’ Bowles reminded the Soviet editor, ‘virtually every American now living in India 
is a secret agent working to block India’s economic progress, to create internal strife and to 
bribe public officials.’ Reiterating the appeal that he had issued several months earlier, to ‘Keep 
the Cold War out of India’, Bowles urged the Kremlin forgo ‘bitter attacks’ and work with the 
United States in promoting Indian development. ‘If we slip back into the old cold war 
atmosphere,’, the Ambassador counselled, ‘we shall all be the losers – Russians, Americans, 
and Indians – and a historic opportunity will have been lost.’86  
 15 
Bowles intervention was aimed, as he characterised it to Arthur Goldberg, US Ambassador 
to the United Nations, ‘to knock down the flood of anti-U.S. propaganda the Soviets are 
pouring into India.’87 It had limited impact. Supportive of Bowles efforts to avert a 
disinformation war in the subcontinent, Goldberg nevertheless painted a pessimistic picture of 
a troubling disinclination on the part of Moscow and New Delhi work constructively with the 
United States on the global stage. In writing to thank Bowles for forwarding him a copy of his 
latest American Reporter piece, Goldberg observed: 
 
I can quite understand your concern over the problem of Soviet planted anti-U.S. propaganda 
in India for the Indian delegation here at the UN, with the apparent encouragement of the 
Soviets, has frequently been unhelpful on issues where one might have expected them to be 
cooperative or at least neutral. I cannot agree more with your determination that we cannot 
afford a return to the cold war atmosphere and must attempt to work together.88 
 
The frustrations shared by Bowles and Goldberg overplayed the efficacy of Soviet 
disinformation in India, and underrepresented the Indian government’s aversion to it. One 
contemporaneous political report sent to New Delhi from the Indian Embassy in Moscow 
revealed the existence of, ‘quite a lot of resentment in India of critical references of the 
broadcasts of the Radio Peace and Progress… in which some distinguished Indian leaders were 
maligned.’ Indian officials in the Soviet capital had made clear to their Russian counterparts 
that, ‘such partisan articles by Soviet publicity media were bound to affect relations between 
the two countries.’ Although Moscow disclaimed any responsibility for Radio Peace and 
Progress, Indian protests did produce, ‘a perceptible decrease in the volume of anti-Indian 
comments in… broadcasts.’89 The Soviet decision to recalibrate its black propaganda, and aver 
largely counterproductive attacks on Indian nationals, provided little comfort for Bowles. The 
flow of Soviet disinformation into India that targeted the United States, continued unabated. 
With American calls for a propaganda truce with the Soviets in India falling on deaf ears, 
US officials resumed their struggle to blunt Communist disinformation. In January 1968, the 
British High Commission noted with interest the appearance of an article in the popular 
magazine, Young India. The publications editor, Sagar Ahluwalia, British diplomats reflected, 
‘relies heavily on the Americans, from whom the article doubtless stems.’90 Financial 
incentives from American sources had undoubtedly encouraged Ahluwalia to carry earlier 
stories ‘exposing’ KGB funding of left-wing Indian parliamentarians. On this occasion, the 
article in question, provocatively entitled, ‘Did KGB Man Forge the Freeman Telegram’, 
rehearsed Bowles’ conviction that Yuri Modin was the individual behind the forged British 
document. Modin had left India in April 1967, only nine months after his posting to New Delhi. 
This abnormally short tour for a Soviet ‘diplomat’, Young India asserted, represented ‘proof, 
if any were needed, that Modin came to India only to interfere with the [national] elections.’ 
Citing a Western ‘source’, the article went on to claim that Modin’s credentials as a forger 
were firmly established, and that India’s Home Ministry was, ‘well aware of Modin’s role in 
this sinister business.’ The Indian government had been furnished with evidence from its 
Intelligence Bureau, Ahluwalia professed, ‘that Modin…was the probable source of forgeries 
linking the United States Embassy, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the British … High 
Commission to the Congress Party and to more conservative parties.’ Demanding that Chavan 
name Modin as the forger, and take appropriate punitive action against the Soviet Embassy, 
the article called on its readers to, ‘join “Young India” in condemning this sort of K.G.B. 
propaganda, and in urging our Government to protest to the Soviet Union not to send any more 
K.G.B spies to New Delhi.’91 
The application of American pressure on the Indian government through ‘friends’ in the 
local press was amplified by official protests from Washington. Exasperated by the persistence 
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of Soviet black propaganda in India, in March, Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, 
authorized Bowles to issue a formal statement protesting at a, ‘series of forgeries surfaced by 
some who would seek to disrupt friendly relations between the United States and India.’ 
Prominently referencing the Freeman telegram, Bowles statement, which was shown to the 
Indian government twenty-four hours prior to its public release, emphasized that Washington, 
‘have hoped, and continue to hope that India will cease being used as a disinformation cockpit 
by those who would disturb Indo-US relations.’92 Bowles’ latest appeal to moderate the 
escalation in superpower propaganda in the subcontinent, proved to be as fruitless as his first, 
that had been made almost exactly a year before. The United States’ relationship with India 




In November 1989, as in Europe the Berlin Wall fell, and the Cold War’s endgame began to 
play out, the Hindustan Times, a leading Indian daily, published allegations that the CIA had 
been conspiring with opposition parties to subvert the government of Rajiv Gandhi, and his 
ruling Congress Party. Coming on the eve of a general election in India, in which the left-
leaning Gandhi was expected to face a tough fight to secure a further term in office, the pro-
government Hindustan Times claimed that a one-million-dollar grant had been funneled to the 
prime minister’s political rivals by the CIA. Accompanied by photostats of purportedly official 
documents originating from the US Embassy in India, the State Department, and the CIA, the 
news report was dismissed by American officials as ‘mischievous’, based upon ‘patent 
forgery’, and ‘designed to damage Indian-American relations at a critical time.’93 Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the New York Democrat, and former US Ambassador to India, 
attacked the Indian newspaper revelations as baseless, and informed by, ‘a painful - dare I say, 
pathetic – forgery.’94 When it came to Soviet disinformation in India, little had changed, it 
seemed, since 1967. 
Indeed, in the wake of the Freeman telegram controversy, although the Indian government 
did seek to restrict foreign interference in the nations domestic affairs, the United States in 
general, and the CIA in particular, remained prime targets for Communist disinformation 
activity in the subcontinent. In December 1971, India’s premier, and Rajiv Gandhi’s mother, 
Indira Gandhi, was infuriated by the Nixon administration’s decision to “tilt” to Pakistan 
following the outbreak of Indo–Pakistani hostilities. After 1971, India’s relationship with the 
United States was bedevilled by an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust. Bilateral ties 
were strained by tensions over issues as diverse as the war in South Vietnam; debts India had 
accumulated purchasing American foodstuffs; New Delhi’s pursuit of nuclear weapons; and 
Gandhi’s willingness to court Moscow’s support. In this context, India provided fertile political 
soil in which Soviet black propaganda continued to flourish. Expressing a viewpoint widely 
held in British and American diplomatic circles, one senior official in Britain’s IRD observed 
with weary resignation that, ‘There is no end to Mrs Gandhi’s gullibility or disposition to 
believe ill of the Americans, and I doubt there is much that can be done about this.’95 
In March 1976, the Indian parliament passed legislation regulating foreign contributions to 
political organizations, and limiting the type and scale of payments to Indian newspaper owners 
and intermediaries from third parties. Moreover, Indian parliamentary enquires undertaken at 
the time referenced covert Soviet interference in the country’s domestic political affairs. On 
the whole, however, Soviet intelligence agencies, and their activities in the subcontinent, came 
in for far less attention than their American counterparts. In the mid-1970s, one British official 
observed that a lengthy Indian government note on, ‘foreign money in India,’ referenced the 
KGB less than half-a-dozen times. In the same report, the CIA was listed on 60 separate 
occasions. Equally, the British underlined that, ‘qualitatively, the [Indian] note gives the 
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impression that American interference is taken more seriously at the official or political level 
than Soviet interference.’96 
Back in the United States, State Department assessments of Soviet ‘active measures’, or 
aktivnyye meropriyatiya, including disinformation-by-forgery, highlighted a tendency on the 
part of countries inside the developing world to ‘ignore or downplay’ Soviet back propaganda. 
In October 1981, during a press conference covering Soviet disinformation and political 
operations, State Department officials singled out India for special mention. Moscow, 
American journalists were informed, continued to privilege Blitz as a vehicle, ‘to publish 
forgeries, falsely accuse Americans of being CIA personnel or agents, and disseminate Soviet-
inspired documents.’ Worryingly for the State Department, the Soviets appeared to have 
learned from experience and, over time, to have become more accomplished and efficient 
forgers. ‘On the basis of the historical record,’ American officials predicted, ‘there is every 
reason to believe that the Soviet leadership will continue to make heavy investments of money 
and manpower in meddlesome and disruptive operations around the world.’ In the case of India, 
at least, such warnings had proved to be well founded.97 As one British official had earlier 
noted, the Indian subcontinent constituted something of an experimental laboratory in which 
Soviet covert propaganda techniques were trialled and honed before being deployed across the 
developing world. ‘The Russians have, of course,’ and IRD officer mused, ‘used their 
experiences in India in many ways as a model for penetration of other countries and indeed 
their connexions with India as a direct instrument.’98 
And what of the individuals, the personal victims of disinformation-by-forgery? In the case, 
John Freeman, after leaving India in 1968 and, following a brief stint as Britain’s Ambassador 
in Washington, he withdrew from political life, and turned his hand to broadcast journalism. 
Encountering Freeman in London, shortly after his return from the subcontinent, Richard 
Crossman, the Labour cabinet minister, observed that he had become almost unrecognisable. 
‘John used to be a rather willowy, elegant young man with wonderful wavy hair,’ Crossman 
confided to his diary, ‘but he’s thickened out and his actual complexion has roughened so that 
he looks like an extremely tough colonel of a polo-playing regiment just back from India – big 
and bluff.’99 First hand exposure to Soviet disinformation operations, it seemed, obliged 
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